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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000218

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [NATO](#) [OSCE](#) [KCFE](#)  
SUBJECT: VCC AND EXPERTS MEETINGS, MARCH 29, 2007

REF: STATE 38562

Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (SBU) Summary: During meetings on March 29, VCC experts reached agreement on procedures for reporting ambiguities related to BRM-1K vehicles and use of GPS during inspections; they will continue to address use of digital cameras to report ambiguities and definition of inspection site. The VCC agreed the VCC seminar will be held Oct 4-5. The VCC sent several issues to the experts for discussion over the next few months: possible coordination of Vienna Document verification activities; follow-up to the Central Asian Republics seminar; information about dates associated with updates to the CFE inspectors list and start of the Treaty residual year; and a response to Poland's question on reporting the entry into service of conventional armaments and equipment. See guidance requests paragraphs 2 and 6. End summary.

¶2. (C) Results of the experts meeting:

-- (SBU) Reporting on BRM-1K vehicles (AC/319-D(2005)0001 (CFE)): Experts agreed to several amendments to this paper; the Chair will issue a revised note under silence procedure. The following changes will be made: a new paragraph noting that Russia has not notified BRM-1K vehicles at all since the July 2005 exchange; status will be updated to reflect that Russia does not brief these vehicles at all; and current paragraph 4.2 and its Annex will be deleted since Russia does not address these vehicles.

-- (SBU) Digital cameras: Germany noted that paragraph two of the Chair's proposal did not include any provision addressing the possibility that use of a digital camera is denied. The Chair suggested that Polaroid film was still an option, but withdrew his proposal since it did not address the issue adequately. The Chair then asked for agreement on the German proposal. When U.S. rep noted this would be satisfactory for declared site inspections, but that it did not fully address our concerns with regard to use for specified area inspections, the Chair deferred the issue to a future meeting and asked U.S. rep to seek alternative language. (Comment and Guidance Request: Following the meeting, U.S. experts discussed the text in light of reftel and tried to identify a way forward. We recommend using the Chair's (withdrawn) proposal, but including language that calls for the inspected State Party to provide the digital camera and printer to photograph ambiguities if it otherwise refuses use of digital cameras by the inspecting State Party. Mission requests Washington review this suggestion and provide guidance to make the proposal in advance of the next experts meeting on May 16, in order to reach agreement on this issue. End Comment and Guidance Request.)

-- (SBU) GPS: After U.S. rep noted concerns with the text regarding use during specified area inspections, Canada suggested revising the end of the text to call for use of GPS to verify the coordinates of units, sites and facilities inspectable under Section VIII as notified under the information exchange or notifications. Judging this to meet the guidance provided reftel, U.S. rep agreed to the Chair's proposal to draft and put under a silence a letter to send the text on use of GPS to Vienna.

-- (C) Definition of inspection site: Several delegations noted that language in the German paper was not consistent with Treaty language; Germany agreed, noting that the translation from German had been made without referring to the Treaty itself (in English). Per reftel, U.S. rep questioned whether the effort was likely to meet with success in Vienna. Germany will contact their Vienna delegation seeking a reply to the U.S. question. The Chair will issue a revised text so discussion can continue at the next meeting. On the margins, a German representative stated that the impetus behind Germany's proposal was a bilateral disagreement with Russia over the definition of an inspection site and the inspected State Party's obligations to provide information on units and holdings at the site. On the advice of the German delegation in Vienna, Germany is seeking Allied agreement on this issue before pursuing it further.

13. (C) The VCC received information about the following planned Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) verification events:

-- (C) Evaluation visits to be conducted on a bilateral basis: Denmark to Albania, April 16-20; Hungary to Serbia, April 3-5; and Hungary to Ukraine, April 11-13.

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-- (C) Inspections announced previously: Canada to Tajikistan, originally scheduled for Feb 26, has been rescheduled to April 23-27 following discussions with the Tajiks; Slovenia to Albania in March has been postponed, but no date announced; and Denmark to Tajikistan has been postponed from April 16-20, with no date announced.

-- (C) Inspections announced at this meeting: U.S. to Serbia the week of April 1; Spain to Montenegro, May 14-18; Germany to Armenia, June 18-21; the UK to Turkmenistan, June 18-21; and Romania to Croatia, May 7-11.

14. (SBU) The VCC agreed to have experts discuss the suggestion to coordinate VD99 verification events with non-Allies; it may be discussed as early as April 24. ACCS will draft a food-for-thought paper on this topic; Germany indicated they would make a contribution. Based on recent comments by Germany in Vienna and the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, we expect Germany to be very forward leaning in the VCC on this issue. Denmark and Norway reported that during a recent Nordic seminar, they had discussions with Sweden and Finland on the general topic of coordinating VD99 events; Sweden and Finland expressed interest.

15. (SBU) As follow-up to the Central Asian Republics seminar, Germany noted it will conduct an arms control workshop at the regional center in Kazakhstan July 16-22; attendees will be announced later. This general topic (follow-up to the seminar) will also be passed to the experts, to be discussed as early as April 24.

16. (SBU) The VCC agreed the VCC seminar will be held October 4-5. The experts will meet on April 24 to work out the agenda, to include identifying sponsors for specific topics. ACCS distributed a list of topics for consideration (emailed to VCI/CCA); U.S. rep noted our concern about keeping the focus on implementation issues; the U.S. volunteered to address small arms and light weapons. To prepare for this meeting, delegations are to provide comments on the topic list (additions and/or deletions) by April 11. (Guidance

request: Mission requests information about the topic list be provided in advance of the April 11 deadline. End Guidance request.)

¶17. (U) Since meetings have been scheduled less frequently (e.g., every 7-8 weeks vice every 4 weeks), the VCC agreed to start its meetings at 1330 (vice 1415).

¶18. (C) In addition to the U.S. report delivered per reftel, the following reports were provided:

-- (C) Germany reported on its inspection of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Roshchinskiy on February 13-16. Russia briefed that 144 armored combat vehicles among the unit's holdings are temporarily located in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (specific details on types and locations are contained in the inspection report). Germany also provided a paper and photos on a number of vehicles they encountered during the inspection, which have been added to the POET working group list.

-- (C) France reported on its February 2-9 inspection to the 42nd Armaments and Equipment Storage Base in Vladimirskiy Lager'. During the inspection, the national escorts indicated Russia would add four more POE's: Samara, Rostov-on-Don, St. Petersburg, and Kaliningrad.

-- (C) Romania noted that during the March 5-8 inspection in Russia, they were permitted to use GPS (provided by Russia), and had been allowed to bring digital cameras and to take pictures inside buildings. They did observe a site diagram discrepancy that they commented on via paragraph 7.b.

¶19. (C) Changes to CFE inspection schedule:  
France merged planned inspections to Russia in time blocks (TB) 5 and 10 into a sequential to be conducted in TB 12;  
French inspection to Georgia from TB 7 to TB 32;  
French inspection to Russia flank from TB 31 to TB 52;  
French inspection to Ukraine from TB 36 to TB 35;  
Belgian inspection to Belarus from TB 30 to TB 27; and  
Danish inspection to Russia from TB 34 to TB 26.

¶10. (C) Paired inspections: Georgia will conduct an inspection of Russian stationed forces in Armenia with Turkey; Turkey is currently working out the details. Georgia also wants to pair on an inspection in Russia, but no one has come forward to date; this will be sent to the experts for further discussion.

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¶11. (C) The Chair noted that ACCS is reviewing comments provided on the POET issues paper to ensure all updates are incorporated. They expect to issue the paper under silence next week, and will then send it to the JCG-T in Vienna (if silence is not broken). Transmission of this paper in response to the JCG-T request will complete VCC action on this issue. Indications are that Germany will not object to the paper in its current form.

¶12. (SBU) Information exchange issues: This item was added to the agenda in response to questions raised by Norway, who was seeking clarification of dates for providing the updated list of inspectors and the start of the residual period treaty year. Norway was asked to provide a paper outlining its concerns so the experts will be better prepared to respond. Poland recently provided an F21 adding F-16's to its combat aircraft holdings, but did not provide an F13 (entry into service). Russia questioned why no F13 was provided, and Poland is looking for assistance in responding. They provided a food-for-thought paper on this issue (emailed to VCI/CCA) and will look for advice from the experts during the meeting on May 16.  
NULAND